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Abstract 
 
We analyze differences in the pricing of syndicated loans between U.S. and European loans. 
For credit lines, U.S. borrowers pay significantly higher spreads, but also lower fees, resulting 
in similar total costs of borrowing in both markets. For term loans, U.S. firms pay significantly 
higher spreads. While European firms across the rating spectrum issue terms loans, only low 
quality U.S. firms rely on term loans. U.S. issuers perform worse after loan origination 
compared to European issuers, which explains 30% of the spread differential. Increasing loan 
supply by institutional lenders in the U.S. since 2003 eventually fully removed the term loan 
pricing gap. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we analyze pricing differences between the U.S. and the European loan market. 
Looking at pricing differences across markets is important as it helps us to understand 
international loan market integration of these markets as well as prevalent differences in 
pricing structures and composition of firms active in these markets. For example, Carey and 
Nini (2007) were the first to show that average spreads for syndicated loans differ 
systematically between the European and the U.S. market. Loan spreads in the corporate 
syndicated loan market were, on average, about 30 basis points (bps) smaller in Europe during 
the 1990 to 2002 period. This finding is puzzling as financial theory suggests that arbitrage 
opportunities should be competed away unless this is prevented by market frictions, precisely 
because the market for syndicated loans is globally integrated with a large number of 
international players (borrowers, banks, and non-bank lenders). Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the existence of this puzzle has stirred a wide debate among academics. In this paper, we 
revisit the pricing puzzle documented by Carey and Nini (2007), CN henceforth, and offer a 
novel perspective on this pricing “gap”. 
We start by reproducing the result from CN over the same sample period used in their 
paper (1992-2002) and the same single statistic to measure a firm’s borrowing costs (i.e., the 
All-In-Spread-Drawn (AISD)). We replicate their result with both a similar economic and 
statistical magnitude. Berg, Saunders and Steffen (2015), henceforth BSS, have shown that 
loan contracts are substantially more complex. Loans contain various fees as well as spreads 
that also vary between loan types (term loans and credit lines, in particular). Consequently, it 
is insufficient to describe a loan contract by simply using a single interest rate spread such as 
the AISD. We extend the approach by BSS to investigate the loan-spread differential between 
large U.S. and European firms taking into account fees. This is important as it allows us to 
identify differences in financial contracting between two of the most important capital 
markets globally. Does the pricing gap exist across the different pricing dimensions in loan 
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contracts and for different loan types? And, does the pricing gap persist over time? Financial 
markets have become more innovative attracting a large number of (non-bank) institutional 
investors that have increased the liquidity of the loan markets. How did elevated institutional 
supply by lenders affect loan pricing and, importantly, the pricing differences between U.S. 
and European loans? These are important questions that we seek to answer in this paper. 
We explicitly distinguish between term loans (approximately 30% of the Dealscan 
sample) and lines of credit (approximately 70% of the Dealscan sample). Thus, lines of credit 
comprise the majority of loans in our sample. We document that the prizing puzzle is lower 
for lines of credit (13 bps lower AISD for European borrowers) than for term loans (42 bps 
lower AISD for European borrowers). Crucially, lines of credit and term loans differ 
significantly in their contractual design: while term loans are always fully drawn down at loan 
origination, lines of credit can either be drawn or left undrawn. Borrowers pay the All-In-
Spread-Drawn (AISD) on the drawn amount, while they pay the All-In-Spread-Undrawn 
(AISU) on the undrawn amount. We document that European borrowers pay a lower AISD 
compared to U.S. borrowers (as shown by CN), however, they pay a significantly higher All-
In-Spread-Undrawn (AISU). We show that even under conservative assumptions for the loan 
draw-down rate, the total costs of borrowing (TCB) does not differ significantly across the 
two markets.1 Overall, our results suggest that the pricing structure of lines of credit differs 
fundamentally between European and U.S. syndicated loans. Taking into account these 
different loan-pricing structures allows us to explain the pricing puzzle for lines of credit. 
In a second step, we show that the composition of term loan borrowers differs between 
the U.S. and the European market. That is, (almost) all firms enter the market for credit lines 
to obtain liquidity insurance (Sufi (2009)). In contrast, firms that require term financing can 
choose between issuing a corporate bond and obtaining a bank loan. We document that poor-
																																								 																				
1 The total cost of borrowing is a new cost measure developed in BSS that differentiates between loan types, 
comprises various fees and accounts for different draw-down rates of credit lines. We explain this measure in 
detail in Appendix B.II. 
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creditworthy firms are much more likely to use term loans as their source of borrowed funds, 
while firms of all credit qualities obtain credit lines. Consistent with Europe being a bank-
based market, this effect is significantly stronger in the U.S. than it is in Europe. High credit 
quality European firms are more likely to seek out term loans than high quality U.S. firms 
(who issue bonds instead). 
We further document that European term loan issuers have a significantly better post-
issue performance compared to U.S. term loan issuers: ratings of U.S. firms that obtain a term 
loan decline by 0.7 notches more in the first year after loan origination compared to European 
term loan issuers. Given the extensive evidence on the predictability of agencies' credit rating 
changes (Altman and Kao (1998); Delianedis and Geske (1999); Norden and Weber (2004); 
Löffler (2005)), is seems reasonable to assume that these rating changes are anticipated by the 
market. This is consistent with the narrative that firms with a sliding creditworthiness are not 
able to obtain bond funding, but rather have to rely on monitoring-intensive bank loans. 
Conditioning on borrower future performance significantly reduces pricing differences 
between the U.S. and the European term loan market. 
We extend the original CN sample (1992-2002) and include the 2003 to 20072 period. 
Several interesting results emerge. In the 2003 to 2007 period, the AISD difference of credit 
lines issued to U.S. versus European borrowers increases by almost 50 percent. Again, the 
pricing difference disappears once we include fees to the loan spread differential. The term 
loan spread difference, on the other hand, is only marginally significant and drops by about 
two-thirds in magnitude in the later 2003-2007 period. Moreover, splitting the term loan 
sample into investment grade and non-investment grade rated loans shows that the loan 
spread puzzle does not persist for non-investment grade rated borrowers. In other words, term 
loan spreads between the U.S. and Europe converged over the 2003 to 2007 period and we 
document that this was caused by a decrease in U.S. relative to European term loan spreads.  
																																								 																				
2 We end in 2007 to avoid the effect of crises years. As discussed later our main results are unaffected if we 
extend the sample to 2011. 
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Our results are consistent with the literature documenting a substantial increase in 
supply of capital in U.S. loan markets after 2003 that lasted until the crisis started, particularly 
from institutional investors. Shivdasani and Wang (2011), for example, show that supply of 
capital from CLO funds decreased spreads of leveraged buyout (LBO) loans and the use of 
covenants, while increasing the availability of debt financing. Similarly, Ivashina and Sun 
(2011) show that institutional demand pressure (i.e., for an increase in the supply of debt 
financing) reduced loan spreads on those (term) loans usually provided by institutional 
investors even below spreads demanded by banks for loans to otherwise identical firms. We 
also observe a substantial increase in U.S. institutional term loan issuances after 2001. The 
European loan market, on the other hand, largely lacked this increase in institutional loan 
suppliers. We hypothesize and empirically test whether the additional loan supply from 
institutional investors reduced the spreads of U.S. vis-à-vis European loans, and whether the 
pricing gap for term loans was removed or reduced. Our results are consistent with this 
hypothesis. 
We perform several robustness tests. For example, Gaul and Uysal (2013) argue that 
unobserved differences in firm volatility play an important role in explaining pricing 
differences between U.S. and European firms. We show that higher equity volatility (as a 
measure of unobserved firm asset volatility) cannot explain pricing differences of U.S. versus 
European credit line issuances. A higher equity (asset) volatility suggests a higher expected 
draw-down rate of credit lines, which also increases the commitment fees paid (BSS, 2015). 
We document, however, that commitment fees of loans to European firms are larger than in 
the U.S. In the subsample of unrated term loans, we find that equity volatility explains loan 
spread differences between the U.S. and Europe, which is intuitive given the larger 
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informational asymmetries associated with unrated firms. Importantly, however, the results in 
the rated subsample are unaffected when equity volatility enters the regression model.3 
Our paper relates to different strands of the literature: first, our paper emphasizes the 
importance of explicitly distinguishing between different types of loans (term loans and lines 
of credit in particular) when analyzing loan pricing. Gatev and Strahan (2009) show that term 
loans and lines of credit differ in their syndicate structure: while commercial banks dominate 
in lending of lines of credit, investment banks, insurance companies, and hedge funds 
dominate in term lending. BSS (2015) document that the pricing structure of term loans and 
lines of credit differs significantly and reflects the various options embedded in both loan 
contracts. We contribute to the loan contracting literature by analyzing pricing structures in an 
international setting and by showing that pricing structure differences can explain the loan 
spread differences between U.S. and European syndicated loans for credit lines. 
Second, we add to the literature on the choice between private and public debt. While 
contingent liquidity is almost exclusively provided by banks via credit lines, term funding can 
also be obtained in the bond market (Gatev and Strahan (2009); Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein 
(2002)). 4  We document that both in Europe and the U.S., companies across the credit 
spectrum obtain credit lines. In Europe, however, both high and low quality firms obtain term 
loans, while in the U.S. high quality firms are more likely to issue public debt (De Fiore and 
Uhlig (2011). Our results indicate that European term loan issuers are not directly comparable 
to U.S. term loan issuers – even after controlling for observable differences in credit risk. 
Further, by documenting that the structure of the U.S. term loan market differs significantly 
from that of the European market, we add to the growing literature on the international 
																																								 																				
3 We perform other robustness tests as well. For example, we extend our results and include the 2008 to 2011 
period and find that our results are identical. We also differentiate between relationship and non-relationship 
loans that might have an impact on the loan spread difference. Relationship effects, however, do not explain our 
findings. We do not report these tests for brevity but they are available from the authors upon request. 
4  See also Denis and Mihov (2003), Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1993), Houston and James (1996), and 
Carey, Post, and Sharpe (1998) on the choice between public and private debt. 
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syndicated loan market structure (Esty and Megginson (2004); Giannetti and Laeven (2012); 
Giannetti and Yafeh (2012)). 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we discuss the institutional environment. 
In Section 3, we describe the data, provide descriptive statistics, and show the base 
specification. We investigate the loan pricing puzzle separately for credit lines and term loans 
in section 4 and discuss alternative hypotheses in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Environment and Framework 
Before we empirically investigate differences in loan contracts for U.S. versus European 
loans, we review the theoretical and empirical literature on loan contracting to provide an 
economic framework in which we can interpret our empirical results. We focus on two 
aspects in particular, i.e., the conceptual differences between credit lines and term loans, and 
the choice firms have to borrow from banks or corporate bond markets. 
 
2.1. Credit Lines versus Term Loans 
Credit line and term loan contracts are inherently different, however, most of the empirical 
literature lumps them together.5 Term loans have an overall plain structure: firms receive the 
full loan amount upfront and repay the loan at maturity, usually 5 to 8 years after loan 
origination (“bullet repayment”). They pay contractually set spreads and fees until the loan 
matures. Some term loans (sometimes referred to as “Term Loan A”) are amortizing loans, 
where borrowers pay interest and principal as scheduled until maturity. 
Credit lines are not only more frequently used in corporate finance, but are also more 
complex. 6  Instead of outright funding, credit lines provide contingent liquidity. That is, 
instead of drawing down the committed loan amount, firms keep the credit line as insurance 
																																								 																				
5 An exception being Gatev and Strahan (2009) as noted earlier as well as BSS who empirically show how the 
pricing structure reflects the complexity of loan contracting. 
6 Sufi (2009) reports that 82% of firm-years in the U.S. and even 32% of otherwise all-equity financed firms 
have credit lines. 
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against future liquidity needs (for example, as a backup for a commercial paper program). 
This complexity is also reflected in the pricing structure of credit lines which consists of 
various fees in addition to the loan spread.  
Fees perform certain functions and are therefore important. First, they account for 
options embedded in credit lines, such as the option to draw-down the credit line when firms 
need liquidity (Thakor, Hong, and Greenbaum (1981); Thakor (1982); Ho and Saunders 
(1983); Boot, Thakor and Udell (1987); Thakor and Udell (1987); Chateau (1990); Shockley 
and Thakor (1997)). Second, they help banks to screen borrowers if the latter have private 
information about their creditworthiness (Thakor and Udell (1987)). Indeed, BSS (2015) 
show empirically how and why fees come in various forms in loan contracts and how they 
vary across different loan contracts based on borrower fundamentals. 
To summarize, lenders do not use a single statistic such as the interest rate spread to 
ensure an appropriate expected return but a combination of fees and spread. It is thus a 
testable hypothesis whether the observed pricing differential between U.S. loans and 
European loans over the 1992-2002 period was a function of the full pricing menu of loan 
contracts as well as the type of loan considered, and not just a function of a simple loan 
interest rate spread. In particular, as fees are more important for credit lines than term loans, 
we expect so see a larger effect of fees loan pricing for credit lines. 
 
2.2 Bank versus Bond Markets 
As described above, the term loan market differs from the market for credit lines in several 
ways. Most importantly, while term loans provide relatively long-term funding to borrowers, 
lines of credit usually provide short-term sources of contingent liquidity. While term funding 
is also available in the bond market, contingent liquidity is almost exclusively provided by 
banks (Gatev and Strahan (2009); Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002)). This implies that firms 
seeking liquidity insurance have to enter the market for credit lines. In contrast, firms that 
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require term funding have the option to either issue a corporate bond or obtain a term loan. 
Bond issues are especially attractive for large rated companies with low credit risk that do not 
require close monitoring by banks. 
Several studies show that European countries have bank-based capital markets in that 
corporations obtain most of their debt financing from banks (De Fiore and Uhlig (2011); 
Gorton and Schmid (2000)). Figure 1 plots the debt structure of U.S. and European companies 
since 2002 based on data from Capital IQ.7 
[Figure 1] 
Figure 1 provides interesting insights into the debt structure of European and U.S. 
companies that are consistent with prior literature. Panel A of Figure 1 shows that while rated 
European firms obtain about 45% of their debt financing via bond markets, the ratio of bond 
debt to other debt is over 75% for rated U.S. companies. Panel B of Figure 1 plots the number 
of loan issues by credit quality. While we observe both high and low quality term loan issuers 
in Europe, the vast majority of term loan issuers in the U.S. are non-investment grade firms.  
This descriptive evidence suggests that large European companies are more likely to 
borrow via term loans, while large U.S. companies satisfy their funding needs via bond issues. 
It is thus a testable hypothesis whether a pricing puzzle is also prevalent in the term loan 
market for investment grade firms, i.e., it should be more likely to observe larger low risk 
European companies issuing term loans but not large low risk U.S. companies (who issue 
bonds instead). 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
7 The figure is based on all firms in our sample with available data from CapitalIQ. The data sample will be 
described in more detail in the next section. The broad pattern of differences between U.S. and European 
firms’ debt structures is not sensitive to the sample choice.   
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3. The Loan Pricing Puzzle 
3.1. Data 
We obtain information on individual loan facilities from the Dealscan database maintained by 
the Loan Pricing Corporation (henceforth, LPC). LPC contains detailed information on loans 
to large firms. While a large part of the literature using LPC data focuses on loans to U.S. 
corporations, LPC also provides information on large non-U.S. loans.8 To investigate loan 
spread differences between U.S. and European loans, we extract all loan facilities issued by 
borrowers in the U.S. and Europe. Following CN, we exclude all loans issued by borrowers 
that are not rated at the time of the loan issue. Agency credit ratings are obtained from 
Standard and Poor’s. Focusing on loans by rated companies ensures that we can control for 
any observable differences in credit risk between U.S. and European loans without much 
noise. Consistent with CN, we retain financial firms in our sample, however, all our results 
remain qualitatively unaffected if we exclude firms with SIC codes 6000 – 6999.9 We restrict 
our sample to the 1992 to 2007 period, i.e., we exclude the financial crisis, which affected the 
U.S. and Europe differently. Importantly, however, all our results remain qualitatively 
unaffected if we analyze the 1992 to 2011 period that includes the 2008-2009 crisis years.10 
We follow CN and do not control for borrower characteristics other than the credit 
rating in our main analyses to avoid losing a significant number of observations (in particular 
for the already small European subsample). However, we additionally obtain borrower 
information from Compustat for robustness.11 All our results are qualitatively similar if we 
control for items such as total assets, leverage, profitability, and the market-to-book ratio.12 
All variables are described in detail in Appendix A. 
																																								 																				
8 See for instance, Giannetti and Laeven (2012), Giannetti and Yafeh (2012). Saunders and Steffen (2011) use 
Dealscan data to investigate loan spread differences between public and private firms in the UK. 
9 The results are available upon request. 
10 The results are available on request and are not included in the paper for reasons of space. 
11 We use Michael Robert’s Dealscan-Compustat Linking Database to merge Dealscan with Compustat (see 
Chava and Roberts (2008)). We obtain borrower information from the last available fiscal year before the loan 
issue. 
12 The results are available upon request. 
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Our final sample consists of 12,721 U.S. and 1,075 European loan tranches issued by	
2,242 distinct borrowers (of which 263 are European firms). Table 1 presents descriptive 
statistics for the final sample, segregated into loans issued by U.S. and European borrowers. 
All values are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
[Table 1] 
Panel A of Table 1 shows loan characteristics. The AISD differs significantly between 
both markets and the median spread is 57 bps lower for European loans. Strikingly and 
consistent with CN, European loans are much larger than U.S. loans. The mean/median loan 
amount is $540/$300 million for U.S. loans and $945/$505 million for European loans. Loans 
to European corporations also have a longer maturity compared to loans to U.S. corporations 
– the average maturity is 46 (58) months for U.S. (European) loans. Further, the fraction of 
credit lines is higher in the U.S. market (71%) than in the European market (50%). Panel B of 
Table 1 shows borrower characteristics. Consistent with CN, we find that the fraction of 
borrowers that have an investment grade rating is larger in the European loan sample than in 
the U.S. sample. 77% of the borrowers have an investment grade rating at the time of the loan 
issue in the European market compared to 55% in the U.S. market. 
 
3.2. Base Specification 
To examine loan spread differences between U.S. and European corporations, we first 
estimate a model similar to the main specifications in CN as a benchmark and thus restrict the 
time period to 1992 to 2002. We use a regression model of the following form. 
 !"#$ = &' + &) *+,-./	(0/1 +	 &2 3-45	6ℎ4,489/,:;9:8;2 +&< =-,,->/,	6ℎ4,489/,:;9:8;< + &? 3-45	6ℎ4,489/,:;9:8;? .  
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The AISD is the spread over LIBOR. Again note that we follow CN and do not control 
for borrower characteristics other than the credit rating categories (dummies for each notch) in 
our main analyses to avoid losing a significant number of observations.13 Loan characteristics 
include the natural logarithm of the loan amount in USD, an indicator variable for secured 
loans, and dummy variables for different loan maturities (1–3 years, 3–6 years, >6 years, and 
<1 year (omitted category)).14 Further included are loan type dummies (term loan, bridge 
loan, unknown, and line of credit (omitted category)), loan purpose dummies (takeover and 
recapitalization finance, loans financing ships, aircraft, and special-purpose vehicles, project 
finance, commercial paper backups, and general corporate purpose loans (omitted category)), 
year dummies, and industry fixed effects (based on 2-digit SIC codes). We report the results 
in Panel A of Table 2. 
[Table 2] 
We find that the AISD is 21bps lower in Europe compared to the U.S. over the 1992 to 
2002 period (column (1)). The magnitude of the effect is similar to the results reported by CN 
(-25bps for the 1992 to 1998 period and -37bps for the 1999 to 2002 period, see CN Table VII 
column (A)). The average AISD in the U.S. is 147bps, i.e., European firms payed 
significantly less compared to the unconditional mean spread on U.S. loans. As expected, 
larger loans have lower spreads, while secured loans have higher spreads, on average. Loans 
with a maturity of >6 years have higher spreads than short-term loans, i.e., loans with 
maturities below one year (omitted category). The other maturity indicators are not 
statistically significant. 
We then distinguish between investment grade (column (2)) and non-investment grade 
loans (column (3)). The pricing puzzle is broadly similar for both categories in terms of 
																																								 																				
13 Our results are qualitatively similar if we follow the robustness tests in CN and control for items such as total 
assets, leverage, profitability, and the market-to-book ratio. The results are available upon request.   
14 Note that, in contrast to CN, we do not include rating migration indicators to avoid further restricting the 
sample. 
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economic magnitude (23bps for investment-grade loans versus 21bps for non-investment 
grade), but the statistical significance is higher for investment grade borrowers.    
We then distinguish between credit lines (column (4)) and term loans (column (5)) and 
find that the loan spread puzzle extends to both loan types. While credit lines of European 
firms have 12bps lower spreads, the loan spread difference increase to 65bps for term loans. 
We test the null hypothesis that the loan cost advantage of European firms is of the same size 
for credit lines and term loans and reject this hypothesis at any conventional confidence level.  
In a next step, we extend the sample period to also include the 2003 to 2007 period 
(before the financial crisis started).15 We run the same regressions and report the results in 
Panel B of Table 2. Two interesting results emerge. First, lower loan spreads for credit lines 
of European borrowers also extends to the longer sample. The magnitude of the difference 
even increases from 12bps to 17bps. Second, the loan spread difference for term loans 
becomes substantially smaller (22bps versus 65bps). That is, term loan spreads between the 
U.S. and Europe began to converge over the 2003 to 2007 period. 
Our results are consistent with the literature documenting a substantial increase in 
supply of capital in U.S. loan markets after 2003 that lasted until the crisis started in the fall of 
2007. This enhanced supply was from the increased entry of institutional investors into the 
loan syndication market. Shivdasani and Wang (2011), for example, show that supply of 
capital from CLO funds decreased spreads of LBO loans while increasing the availability of 
debt financing. Similarly, Ivashina and Sun (2011) show that institutional demand pressure 
(i.e., an increase in supply of debt financing) reduced loan spreads on those (term) loans 
usually provided by institutional investors even below spreads demanded by banks for loans 
to otherwise identical firms. We investigate this in more detail in Section 4.3 below. 
																																								 																				
15 As noted earlier our results are robust if we include the crisis years.  
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In the following sections, we investigate how differences in loan contract structures 
can help us understand these observed spread pricing differences between U.S. and European 
loans.  
 
4. Understanding the Prizing Puzzle 
4.1. Pricing Puzzle for Lines of Credit 
Our results so far indicate that the magnitude of the pricing puzzle for AISD differs for term 
loans and lines of credit. We analyze the pricing of lines of credit in more detail in this 
section. Distinguishing between term loans and lines of credit is important, as term loans 
provide longer term funding to borrowers, while lines of credit provide short-term contingent 
liquidity. Contingent liquidity means that borrowers do not necessarily immediately use the 
entire loan amount that is committed by the bank. However, most loan pricing studies 
implicitly make this assumption by solely focusing on the All-In-Spread-Drawn16 (AISD) as 
the main proxy for the price of a loan. We calculate the Usage-Weighted-Spread (UWS) as 
more comprehensive measure of credit line pricing. The UWS is a weighted average of the 
AISD, i.e., the spread paid by the borrower on used loan commitments, and the All-In-
Spread-Undrawn17 (AISU), i.e., the spread paid by the borrower on committed but not yet 
used loans. 
 
UWS (PDD) =  PDD*AISD+(1-PDD)*AISU (1) 
 
PDD (Probability of draw-down) is the probability that a committed loan is actually 
drawn down. A PDD of one implies that the borrower borrows the entire commitment under 
																																								 																				
16  The AISD contains the spread and the facility fee. Facility fees are fees paid on the entire committed amount, 
regardless of usage. 
17  The AISU contains the commitment fee and the facility fee. Commitment fees are fees paid on the unused 
amount of loan commitments. Facility fees are fees paid on the entire committed amount, regardless of usage. 
Commitment fees and facility fees are usually mutually exclusive. 
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the loan agreement; a PDD of zero implies that the borrower never actually draws down the 
loan commitment at all. Ideally, one should use a firm/loan specific PDD, however, this 
information was not readily available prior to 2002. However, BSS (2015) use credit line 
usage data from 2002 onwards from CapitalIQ to show that the credit line draw-down rate is 
on average 25-35% for rated U.S. firms.18 We confirm that credit lines usage is similar for 
Europe and thus we use a draw-down rate of 25-35% in the following specifications.  
Figure 2 shows the pricing structure across markets. We find that, while the AISD is 
lower in the European market, the AISU, in contrast, is significantly higher in the European 
market relative to the U.S. market. This implies that the overall or actual total cost of 
borrowing (TCB) may not be different for U.S. borrowers relative to European borrowers. For 
example, for investment grade borrowers in Europe, the AISD for credit lines is on average 
48 bps, which is approximately 16 bps lower than in the U.S. (64 bps). For the AISU, 
however, we observe the opposite result: the AISU in the European market is larger than the 
AISU in the U.S. market (18 bps versus 14 bps). For borrowers with a below investment 
grade rating, the AISD (AISU) for the average European borrower is 156 bps (47 bps), the 
AISD (AISU) for the average U.S. borrower is 195 bps (40 bps).19 
[Figure 2 here] 
BSS (2015) show that fees are an integral part of loan pricing. More than 80% of 
syndicated loan contracts contain fees and accounting for fees can lead to significantly higher 
costs of corporate borrowing. We follow BSS (2015) and calculate a measure for the total cost 
of borrowing (TCB). The TCB expands upon the UWS by adding further fees (upfront fees, 
cancellation fees, and utilization fees) and by predicting usage rates using observable firm 
characteristics.20  
																																								 																				
18 See Table III in BSS. 
19 Appendix Table B.1 provides descriptive statistics for Figure 2 and decomposes both AISD and AISU into its 
components. 
20 We refer to BSS (2015) and Appendix B of this paper for a detailed description of the TCB measure. 
Dealscan is a reliable data source for the fees, i.e., correctly reports the existence and magnitude of these fees in 
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Table 3 provides multivariate regressions for the AISD, AISU, and the usage-
weighted spread as defined in (1). Consistent with the univariate evidence from Figure 2, the 
AISD is lower for European credit lines, but the AISU is higher for European credit lines. For 
the usage-weighted spread, differences between U.S. and European credit lines are 
economically small and statistically insignificant or only marginally significant (columns (3)-
(5)). For example, the coefficient for the European market dummy is only -1 bps assuming a  
draw down probability of 25% (column (5)). Using the TCB measure which adds other loan 
fees specified in loan contracts – as defined in BSS (2015) and Appendix B in this paper – 
further reduces any pricing differences between the U.S. and the European markets. As can be 
seen, the coefficient on the European market dummy is close to zero and statistically 
insignificant in the TCB regression.21  
[Table 3 here] 
Figure 3 shows the pricing puzzle for credit lines over time, distinguishing between 
AISD and TCB. The figure illustrates that the pricing puzzle is significantly less volatile for 
the TCB relative to the AISD, i.e., the difference between the AISD and the TCB results are 
not driven by some outlier years. Overall, we provide evidence that, while the pricing 
structure differed between the U.S. and the European credit line markets, the overall total 
costs of borrowing did not. 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
 
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
more than 95% of the cases. BSS use a random sample of 1,000 loan contracts from the EDGAR database, report 
the fee information disclosed in the original loan contracts and compare these fees with information from 
Dealscan for the most prominent fee types such as commitment fee, facility fee, utilization fee and cancellation 
fee. A detailed discussion related to upfront fees is provided in BSS. This fee type is usually less frequently 
available due to the private nature and negotiation of upfront fees. See also Appendix B for further details on the 
TCB calculation. 
21  In our results, the main difference between the UWS and TCB results stems from the usage prediction. In 
particular, the usage rate prediction from BSS is lower for investment grade firms, that is, for the set of firms 
with the largest pricing puzzle for the AISD.  
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4.2. Pricing Puzzle for Term Loans 
The previous section shows that the pricing puzzle for lines of credit disappears after 
accounting for unused commitment fees (AISU) and other fees. In this section, we analyze the 
pricing difference between European and U.S. borrowers in the term loan market.  
[Figure 4 here] 
Our key argument is that – due to the existence of a deeper corporate bond market in 
the U.S. – term loan issuers in the U.S. have different characteristics compared to European 
term loan borrowers. In particular, term loan borrowers in the U.S. are of a worse credit 
quality – both with respect to their existing credit rating at loan origination and with respect to 
their future credit rating changes. It is thus a testable hypothesis whether differences in credit 
quality drive pricing differences between U.S. and European term loans. 
Figure 4 provides a univariate comparison of credit rating changes following loan 
issues. The figure suggests that U.S. firms perform worse than European firms following term 
loan issues. In particular, U.S. investment grade firms are significantly more likely than 
European investment grade firms to be severely downgraded in the year following a term loan 
issue. The likelihood of a downgrade by three or more notches is approximately twice as large 
for U.S. investment grade term loan issuers compared to European investment grade term 
loan issuers.  
There is by now a large literature on the predictability of agencies' credit rating 
changes (Altman and Kao (1998); Delianedis and Geske (1999); Norden and Weber (2004); 
Löffler (2005)) that suggests that these rating changes are anticipated by the market. This is 
consistent with the narrative that firms with a sliding creditworthiness are not able to obtain 
bond funding, but rather need to rely on (monitoring-intensive) bank loans. 
To show this in a multivariate regression framework, we split the baseline results for 
term loans (column (5) of Panel B of Table 2) into investment grade and non-investment 
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grade. Non-investment grade borrowers are more likely to issue term loans (as opposed to 
issue bonds) both in the U.S. as well as in Europe. Therefore, we expect to find differences in 
the sub-sample of investment grade rated firms. Table 4 reports the results. As expected, we 
find that the prizing puzzle is only significant for investment grade term loan issuers (-48bps, 
p<0.01), but it is economically and statistically insignificant for non-investment grade term 
loan issuers (0bps, p>0.10).  
[Table 4 here] 
Table 5 presents a multivariate analysis on post-issue performance. The results 
confirm the univariate evidence from Figure 4: European investment grade firms perform 
significantly better following term loan issues than U.S. investment grade firms. The change 
in credit rating in the year after the loan issue is 0.7 notches lower for European relative to 
U.S. firms (see column (3), ΔRating > 0 indicates downgrades). Results are confirmed when 
looking at post-issuance changes in profitability instead of post-issuance changes in credit 
ratings (column (4)). In contrast, we find no post-issue performance differences  in term loans 
to European and U.S. non-investment grade borrowers. 
[Table 5 here] 
Assuming perfect foresight of credit ratings and profitability changes in the year after 
loan issuance, we control for post-issue performance in a multivariate regression. Results are 
provided in Table 6. The results show that conditioning on post-issue performance 
significantly reduces the prizing puzzle for term loans to investment grade borrowers. Results 
are very similar for rating changes (column (2)), rating and profitability changes (column (3)) 
as well as allowing a more flexible functional form by introducing squared terms for the 
independent variables (column (4)). While the coefficient on the Europe-dummy remains 
statistically significant even in these specifications, it is reduced by approximately 15 bps.  
[Table 6 here] 
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Overall, the results presented in this section clearly demonstrate that the term loan 
market structure in the (market-based) U.S. economy is distinct from the structure in the 
(bank-based) European economy in important ways. In particular, term loan issuers in the 
U.S. not only have lower credit ratings on average at origination, but they also exhibit a worse 
post-issuance credit rating and profitability performance. Thus, any comparison of term loan 
price or non-price terms between the U.S. and Europe needs to take these differences into 
account.  
 
4.3. Competition from institutional lenders 
In section 3 and Panel B of Table 2, we document evidence suggesting that the pricing gap 
between term loan borrowers in the U.S. and Europe narrowed during the 2003-2007 period. 
A possible interpretation of this result is an increase in the supply of funds by institutional 
lenders (investors) in the U.S.22 While the syndicated loan market was dominated by banks 
until 2002, innovations in financial markets opened the loan market for non-bank institutions 
as lenders. Collateralized loan obligations (CLO) funds as well as the possibility to securitize 
loans created additional liquidity and competition to bank funding, creating competitive 
downward pressure on U.S. loan spreads. The increased role of institutional investors has 
been well documented in the literature (Ivashina and Sun, 2011; Nadauld and Weisbach, 
2012; and Shivdasani and Wang, 2011). In addition, Massoud et al. (2011) find that hedge 
funds were more likely to lend to highly leveraged firms where trading on private information 
is highly valuable.  
In addition to a greater supply of funds by institutional lenders in the syndicated loan 
market, the development of the secondary loan market over the past 2002 period also 
increased the liquidity of syndicated loans. For example, Gande and Saunders (2012) 
document the growth of secondary market decreased borrowers’ financial constraints and 
																																								 																				
22 In what follows the terms institutional lenders and institutional investors are synonymous. 
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freed up funds for additional lending. In turn, this may have decreased the liquidity premium 
included in previously illiquid loan spreads.  
If the downward pricing pressure was larger for U.S. relative to European loans, this 
can explain the reduction in the U.S.-Europe spread differential over the 2003-2007 period. 
Figure 5 shows strikingly the significant increase in the supply of loans by non-bank 
institutional lenders over this period, particular in the U.S.  
 [Figure 5 here] 
Panel A of Figure 5 depicts the annual “Bank Term Loan” issuances in our sample for 
the U.S. versus Europe and Panel B of Figure 5 depicts the annual “Institutional Term Loan” 
issuances.23 We observe a substantial increase in U.S. institutional term loans after 2001 with 
the annual number of issuances increasing from below 80 in 2001 to more than 200 in 2004 
and after as shown in Panel B of Figure 5. Interestingly, we do not observe the same time 
trend for institutional loans in Europe. We conject that the additional loan supply from 
institutional investors in the U.S. worked to reduce term loan spreads in the U.S. vis-à-vis 
Europe, eventually closing the pricing gap.  
We introduce an institutional term loan indicator (“Institutional (0/1)”) to test this in 
our empirical framework. Arrangers of syndicated loan deals cater to institutional investors 
carving out tranches that are not amortizing but usually have bullet repayments 3, 5 or more 
years after loan origination.24  We report the results in Table 7. Columns (1) to (2) and 
columns (3) to (4) show regression results using the 1992 to 2002 as well as 1992 to 2007 
period, respectively. Columns (1) and (3) repeat the term loan regressions from Panel A and 
Panel B of Table 2. We add the institutional term loan indicator in columns (2) and (4). 
																																								 																				
23 “Bank Term Loan” is loan type issued for banks. These loans are usually amortizing loans and the early 
repayment does not suited for institutional investors such as private equity funds who have a fixed duration. 
“Institutional Term Loan” is a loan type that usually has a bullet repayment which is better suited for 
institutional investors. 
24 We codify all term loans ranging from “Term Loan B” to “Tern Loan H” in Dealscan as institutional loans as 
these are primarily purchased by institutional investors and as classifications (i.e., letters B, C, D, etc.) of loans 
have changed over time. If Dealscan classifies a loan simply as “Term Loan”, we codify these as “Bank Term 
Loan”. Loan characteristics such as the interest rate spread and syndicate composition are similar to other bank 
loan tranches and we conjecture that these are therefore issued to be purchased by banks. 
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[Table 7 here] 
In the original 1992-2002 sample as well as the extended sample, institutional term 
loans carry larger spreads compared to bank loan tranches, which is consistent with the prior 
literature. Controlling for loan pricing differences between bank and institutional tranche 
types, we still find significantly larger term loan spreads in the U.S. relative to Europe during 
the 1992 to 2002 period. However, the Europe (0/1) indicator variable becomes insignificant 
over the longer 1992 to 2007 sample period when we include the institutional loan dummy, 
consistent with an increase in the supply of capital by U.S. institutional investors in the post 
2002 period. The coefficient of the institutional term loan dummy is positive and significant 
suggesting that institutional term loans carry, on average, larger spreads compared to bank 
term loans. However, the coefficient decreases by more than 20bps once we include the 2003 
to 2007 period, consistent with an increase in competition by institutional lenders and a 
subsequent reduction of institutional loan spreads. Note the substantial increase in the number 
of institutional loans in the extended sample period as reported at the bottom of Table 7. 
While we count 565 institutional term loan tranches during the 1992 to 2002 period, this 
number increases to 1,649 when we include the 2003 to 2007 period. In other words, new 
entry and innovations in loan markets (such as institutionalizing a previously bank dominated 
market through CLOs and the growth of loan investment and mutual funds) eventually 
removed the pricing gap between U.S. and European term loans.  
 
5. Can Equity Volatility Explain the Pricing Structure Puzzle? 
Our results suggest that pricing structure differences explain the loan spread differential 
between the U.S. and the European loan market.  
Gaul and Uysal (2013) suggest that unobserved differences in firm volatility might 
explain the loan pricing puzzle. Building on the theoretical work of Merton (1974) they argue 
that firm volatility is an important determinant of the cost of corporate debt. To operationalize 
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their tests and address possible measurement problems, they use instrumented equity volatility 
as proxy for firm asset volatility. They hypothesize that U.S. firms are riskier (following 
arguments in Bartram et al. (2012)), which results in higher equity volatility of U.S. firms, 
which in turn explains higher loan spreads. Gaul and Uysal (2013) find evidence consistent 
with this hypothesis using the AISD as their measure for loan spreads. 
While higher equity volatility might explain the loan spread puzzle for term loans, the 
hypothesis cannot explain the loan spread puzzle for credit lines. Recall that our earlier results 
show that while European firms pay lower spreads on credit lines, they pay significantly 
higher commitment fees. Higher equity volatility, however, would also increase commitment 
fees for U.S. vis-à-vis European firms because of ex-ante higher expected draw-downs (BSS, 
2015).25 We contrast our hypotheses above to that of Gaul and Uysal (2013) in our next tests. 
While CN investigate a sample of rated firms, Gaul and Uysal (2013) conduct their 
tests on a sample of both rated and unrated firms. Consistent with our methodology in this 
paper and to select a benchmark sample similar to that used by CN, we run our tests on both 
subsamples of rated and unrated firms as well as separately for credit lines and term loans.  
 
5.1. Equity volatility and credit lines 
We start with the subsample of credit lines and report the results in Table 8. 
[Table 8 here] 
Columns (1) to (4) show the results for rated firms and columns (5) to (8) for unrated 
firms, respectively. Consistent with our earlier results, we find that rated U.S. firms pay about 
22 bps lower spreads on their credit lines;26 the loan cost difference, however, disappears once 
we include loan commitment and other fees in our loan cost measure (i.e., when we use the 
																																								 																				
25 Loan commitments are like options which banks write. An increase in volatility will increase the price (fee) 
that the bank charges. 
26  The number of observations is lower compared to our earlier results. In Table 8, we include borrower 
characteristics as additional controls – as in Gaul and Uysal (2013) – and require that we have non-missing 
equity volatility for each observation.  
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TCB). In column (3) we report the results using the AISD as dependent variable following the 
methodology outlined in Gaul and Uysal (2013). We only include the second stage of an 
instrumental variable regression using the predicted equity volatility as measure of firm asset 
volatility. 27  Even after including the predicted volatility, the coefficient of the Europe 
indicator variable is highly significant and does not change in magnitude. Indeed, predicted 
equity volatility does not enter significantly into the regression. In unreported tests, we use the 
AISU as dependent variable and find no evidence that equity volatility explains the higher 
undrawn loan commitment fees paid by European firms. Consistently, we also find no 
evidence that predicted equity volatility affects the costs of credit lines for rated firms taking 
fees and draw-down likelihood into account (column (4)).  
In our sample of unrated firms, we document an even higher AISD loan cost 
difference between U.S. and European firms of about 41bps. Again, using the TCB, the 
differential disappears (column (6)). In column (7), we control for the predicted equity 
volatility in the second stage regression and find, similar to Gaul and Uysal (2013), that 
higher equity volatility increases the AISD. It does not, however, fully explain the pricing 
difference between U.S. and European firms, decreasing the magnitude of the difference only 
by about half (from 41bps to 26bps, significant at the 1 percent level). To summarize the 
discussion, our results suggest that equity volatility can only partially explain the AISD 
interest spread difference between U.S. and European credit lines and, importantly, only for 
unrated firms for which less information is publicly available and for which unobserved firm 
characteristics are more important. In all our tests, our previous results hold, i.e., accounting 
for the fee structure of loans, the total loan cost differential between U.S. and European loans 
fully disappears. 
 
 
																																								 																				
27 The first stage regression results are available upon request. 
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5.2. Equity volatility and term loans 
Table 9 provides results for the term loan sample. Again, we analyze the term loan 
sample separately for rated (columns (1) and (2)) and unrated firms (columns (3) and (4)). As 
fees are less important for term loans, we omit a discussion using fee based measures as 
dependent variables and focus instead on the differences of rated versus unrated firms with 
respect to the basic AISD. Term loans of rated U.S. firms carry 25bps lower loan spreads. 28 
Including the predicted equity volatility in column (2) does not affect the results. That is, 
similar to rated credit lines, equity volatility does not affect the AISD. We also find a 
substantially larger loan spread differential in the subsample of unrated term loans (85bps 
compared to 25bps for rated term loans). Similar to Gaul and Uysal (2013), we find that the 
predicted equity volatility explains AISD loan spread differences for term loans, but only in 
the subsample of unrated firms. 
Taken together, the evidence in this section suggests that (predicted) equity volatility 
can only partially explain the interest rate spread difference between U.S. and European loans 
and, importantly, only that of unrated firms, which were not part of the sample included in the 
original CN paper.   
[Table 9 here] 
  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyze differences in the pricing of syndicated loans between U.S. and 
European loans. Our paper thus adds to the literature initiated by Carey and Nini (2007), who 
document that interest rate spreads on syndicated loans differed systematically between the 
																																								 																				
28 Again, as in Table 8, the number of observations is lower compared to our earlier results. In Table 8, we 
include borrower characteristics – as in Gaul and Uysal (2013) –  as additional controls and require that we have 
non-missing equity volatility for each observation.  
25 
European and the U.S. market during the 1992 to 2002 period. Loan spreads in Europe are, on 
average, about 30 basis points smaller than in the U.S. This paper revisits the pricing puzzle 
and offers potential explanations for their reported puzzle.  
First, we explicitly distinguish between term loans and lines of credit and document 
that, while European borrowers pay lower spreads (AISD) compared to U.S. borrowers, they 
also pay higher fees for their credit lines. This suggests that the pricing structure for credit 
lines is different in the U.S. compared to Europe, with the overall total cost of borrowing 
being very similar across the two markets.  
Second, we document that the composition of borrowers differs between the U.S. and 
the European term loan markets. In particular, poorer-creditworthy U.S. firms are more likely 
to use term loans compared to European firms. Consistently, we find European term loan 
issuers have, on average, a significantly better post-issue performance compared to U.S. term 
loan issuers. We also find a substantially lower pricing gap between U.S. and European term 
loans conditioning on firms’ post-performance, creditworthiness and profitability differences. 
Finally, we extend the sample and include the 2003 to 2007 period29 and find that term 
loan spreads between the U.S. and Europe have converged. We document that this is caused 
by a decrease in U.S. relative to European term loan spreads. We find evidence consistent 
with the hypothesis that the increased supply of syndicated loans by institutional investors 
reduced the spreads of U.S. vis-à-vis European loans, effectively removing the pricing gap.  
Our results also point to potentially fruitful areas of future research. For example, we 
document that the pricing puzzle does not persist in markets for credit lines once we introduce 
the full menu of fees and loan spreads. However, future research might investigate the reasons 
for price structure differences between credit lines issued in the U.S. compared to Europe. For 
example, why do European borrowers pay larger commitment fees compared to otherwise 
similar U.S. firms, even if we include firm equity (asset) volatilities? Why are credit line 
																																								 																				
29 And, in unreported results, 1992-2011 (i.e. including the financial crisis years). 
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AISDs lower in Europe than in the U.S.? We look forward to future research on the pricing 
“bundle” differences of U.S. vs. European syndicated loans. 
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Figure 1. Debt Structure of U.S. and European Firms 
Panel A shows the time series of average firm-level debt structures for public U.S. and European firms. All debt 
items are depicted as a fraction of total assets. Panel B shows the number of loan issues by loan type and credit 
quality separately for the U.S. and the European market. 
 
Panel A. Debt Structure – U.S. versus European Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Number of Loan Issues by Credit Quality 
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Figure 2  
Pricing Structure in the U.S. and the European Loan Market: AISD versus AISU 
This figure shows the mean AISD and the mean AISU for lines of credit issued by European and U.S. firms, 
distinguishing between firms that have an investment grade rating and firms that have a junk rating at the time of 
the loan origination. 
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Figure 3 
Credit Line Pricing Puzzle over Time – AISD versus TCB 
This figure shows the European prizing puzzle for credit lines over time. Specifically, we report estimated 
coefficients from the following regressions: 
 !"#$ = B + &) *+,-./ ∗ D/4,1992 + ⋯+ &)I *+,-./ ∗ D/4,2007 + LMD + N O6= = B + &) *+,-./ ∗ D/4,1992 + ⋯+ &)I *+,-./ ∗ D/4,2007 + LMD + N 
 
We control for year fixed effects, 2-digit SIC code fixed effects, and credit rating fixed effects. Y are control 
variables to control for heterogeneity in loan characteristics (cf. Table 2). The dashed lines represent 95% 
confidence intervals, adjusted for firm-level clustering. 
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Figure 4 
Post Issue Performance 
 
This figure shows the change in the credit rating (notch) of the borrower in the year following a loan issue. 
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Figure 5 
Term Loan Issuances 
This figure plots the annual number of loan issuances in the U.S. versus Europe. Panel A depicts the increase in 
bank term loan issuances (Term A loans), Panel B the increase in institutional term loan issuances (Term B 
loans). 
Panel A. Bank term loans 
 
Panel B. Institutional term loans 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides summary statistics for loan and borrower characteristics for a sample of loans issued between 1992 and 2007. Panel A reports loan characteristics. Panel B 
reports borrower characteristics. For variable definitions see Appendix A. 
     
  U.S. Market  European Market 
Variable  Observations Mean Median Std  Observations Mean Median Std 
           
Panel A: Loan Characteristics           
AISD  12,721 147.44 112.50 124.50  1,075 120.84 55.00 132.73 
Revolver (0/1)  12,721 0.71 1.00 0.46  1,075 0.50 0.00 0.50 
Facility Amount (million USD)  12,721 539.53 300.00 712.66  1,075 945.39 505.00 1089.58 
Maturity (months)  12,721 45.62 54.00 25.61  1,075 58.45 60.00 30.58 
Maturity 1-3yr (0/1)  12,721 0.29 0.00 0.45  1,075 0.20 0.00 0.40 
Maturity 3-6yr (0/1)  12,721 0.56 1.00 0.50  1,075 0.49 0.00 0.50 
Maturity >6yr (0/1)  12,721 0.12 0.00 0.32  1,075 0.29 0.00 0.45 
Purpose: Takeover (0/1)  12,721 0.11 0.00 0.31  1,075 0.13 0.00 0.33 
Purpose: Other (0/1)  12,721 0.43 0.00 0.50  1,075 0.59 1.00 0.49 
Purpose: General Corporate (0/1)  12,721 0.30 0.00 0.46  1,075 0.21 0.00 0.41 
Purpose: Project Finance (0/1)  12,721 0.00 0.00 0.07  1,075 0.03 0.00 0.18 
Purpose: CP Backup (0/1)  12,721 0.15 0.00 0.36  1,075 0.03 0.00 0.18 
Secured (0/1)  12,721 0.39 0.00 0.49  1,075 0.22 0.00 0.41 
           
Panel B:	Borrower Characteristics           
Rating: AAA (0/1)  12,721 0.01 0.00 0.10  1,075 0.02 0.00 0.15 
Rating: AA (0/1)  12,721 0.04 0.00 0.20  1,075 0.13 0.00 0.33 
Rating: A (0/1)  12,721 0.21 0.00 0.41  1,075 0.30 0.00 0.46 
Rating: BBB (0/1)  12,721 0.29 0.00 0.45  1,075 0.32 0.00 0.47 
Rating: BB (0/1)  12,721 0.26 0.00 0.44  1,075 0.13 0.00 0.34 
Rating: B (0/1)  12,721 0.19 0.00 0.39  1,075 0.09 0.00 0.29 
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Table 2 
Base Regression (Carey and Nini (2007) Specification) 
This table provides results of a linear regression of the loan interest rate (AISD) on a European market 
dummy (Europe (0/1)) and control variables. Ln(Facility Amount) is the natural log of the loan 
amount. Maturity 1-3yr (0/1) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the maturity of the loan is between 1 
and 3 years. Maturity 3-6yr (0/1) is an indicator variable if the maturity of the loan is between 3 and 6 
years. Maturity >6yr (0/1) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan maturity is above 6 years. 
Loans with a maturity below 1 year are the omitted group. Secured (0/1) is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the loan is secured. Term Loan (0/1) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan is a term loan. 
Bridge Loan (0/1) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan is a bridge loan. Other Loan (0/1) is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan is neither a credit line or a term loan nor a bridge loan. For 
variable definitions see Appendix A. Column (1) reports the results for the full sample, column (2) for 
investment grade loans (I-Grade), column (3) for non-investment grade loans (Junk). Columns (4) and 
(5) split the sample into credit lines and term loans, respectively. Fixed effects for year, two-digit SIC 
code, and borrower credit rating are included but the coefficients are not shown. Panel A uses the 
Carey and Nini (207) specification and a sample over the 1992 to 2002 period. Panel B extends the 
sample to the end of 2007. We report t-values based on standard errors clustered at the borrowing firm 
in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Carey and Nini (2007) specifications 
  ALL I-Grade Junk Credit Line Term Loan 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    
  AISD AISD AISD AISD AISD 
Europe (0/1) -20.66*** -22.82*** -31.27* -11.57** -65.26*** 
  (-3.22) (-3.69) (-1.85) (-2.31) (-5.18)    
Ln(Facility Amount) -9.68*** -6.86*** -12.06*** -9.86*** -11.52*** 
             (-7.52) (-4.90) (-5.38) (-9.27) (-3.82)    
Maturity 1-3yr (0/1) 8.61 7.44 13.23 -12.60* 51.36*** 
  (1.18) (1.51) (0.71) (-1.66) (2.79)    
Maturity 3-6yr (0/1) -0.16 8.84* -21.66 -17.95** 22.21    
  (-0.02) (1.84) (-1.19) (-2.30) (1.30)    
Maturity >6yr (0/1) 23.16*** 61.23*** -3.24 -8.12 60.00*** 
  (2.59) (5.94) (-0.17) (-0.89) (3.37)    
Secured (0/1) 65.10*** 86.43*** 44.62*** 67.85*** 61.87*** 
  (16.03) (13.64) (9.78) (17.11) (8.51)    
Term Loan (0/1) 55.44*** 64.55*** 44.19*** (omitted) (omitted) 
  (16.06) (10.82) (11.95)     
Bridge Loan (0/1) 82.30*** 44.96*** 134.63*** (omitted) (omitted) 
  (6.59) (4.60) (5.92)     
Other Loan (0/1) 29.46*** 35.13*** 2.02 (omitted) (omitted) 
  (2.71) (2.82) (0.10)     
H0: Europe (0/1)I-Grade   -8.45  
 = Europe (0/1)Junk  (-0.48)  
H0: Europe (0/1)Credit Lines     -53.69*** 
 = Europe (0/1)Term Loans    (-4.48) 
      
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Credit Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Period 1992-2002 1992-2002 1992-2002 1992-2002 1992-2002 
Observations 7,737 4,750 2,987 5,741 1,656 
Adjusted R² 0.65 0.53 0.48 0.67 0.44    
European Facilities 443 359 84 258 135    
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Panel B. Period Extension (1992 – 2007) 
 
  ALL I-Grade Junk Credit Line Term Loan 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    
  AISD AISD AISD AISD AISD 
Europe (0/1) -10.29* -24.13*** -10.85 -16.66*** -21.75* 
  (-1.65) (-4.61) (-0.86) (-5.10) (-1.84)    
Ln(Facility Amount) -12.59*** -7.19*** -17.13*** -11.37*** -19.93*** 
             (-10.77) (-5.73) (-9.57) (-12.87) (-8.39)    
Maturity 1-3yr (0/1) 9.34 7.46* 9.54 -15.25** 26.22* 
  (1.49) (1.76) (0.60) (-2.30) (1.86)    
Maturity 3-6yr (0/1) 2.70 9.68** -20.47 -19.21*** 2.62    
  (0.43) (2.22) (-1.34) (-2.85) (0.20)    
Maturity >6yr (0/1) 26.22*** 78.38*** -8.24 -10.80 28.20** 
  (3.32) (7.68) (-0.52) (-1.40) (2.03)    
Secured (0/1) 61.39*** 91.43*** 37.69*** 61.60*** 61.19*** 
  (17.68) (16.92) (9.93) (19.27) (10.60)    
Term Loan (0/1) 59.19*** 61.90*** 53.68*** (omitted) (omitted) 
  (20.38) (12.39) (16.22)     
Bridge Loan (0/1) 97.15*** 52.59*** 175.85*** (omitted) (omitted) 
  (9.28) (5.63) (9.19)     
Other Loan (0/1) 47.70*** 34.36*** 76.48*** (omitted) (omitted) 
  (4.18) (3.22) (3.03)     
H0: Europe (0/1)I-Grade   13.28  
 = Europe (0/1)Junk  (0.99)  
H0: Europe (0/1)Credit Lines     -5.09 
 = Europe (0/1)Term Loans    (-0.55) 
      
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Credit Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Period 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 
Observations 13,769 7,842 5,954 9,520 3,678 
Adjusted R² 0.59 0.52 0.39 0.64 0.34   
European Facilities 1,075 828 247 537 405    
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Table 3 
Credit Lines: AISD versus AISU – Multivariate Results 
This table provides results of a linear regression of loan pricing terms on Europe (0/1) and control variables as 
reported in Table 2. The coefficients are not shown for brevity, a variable definition is provided in Appendix A. 
Fixed effects for year, two-digit SIC code, and borrower credit rating as well as other loan characteristics are 
included but not shown. The dependent variables are as follows: AISD in column (1), AISU in column (2), an 
undrawn weighted spread (UWS) with different drawdown assumptions (35%, 30%, and 25%) in columns (3) to 
(5), and the TCB in column (6). We report t-values based on standard errors clustered at the borrowing firm in 
parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level, respectively.	
	
Sample: Credit Lines 
Credit 
Lines 
Credit 
Lines 
Credit 
Lines 
Credit 
Lines 
Credit 
Lines 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  Variable AISD AISU UWS(35%) UWS(30%) UWS(25%) TCB 
Europe (0/1) -16.66*** 4.19*** -3.11* -2.07 -1.02 -0.05 
 (-5.10) -4.27 (-1.89) (-1.35) (-0.72) (-0.02)        Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Credit Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose & Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       Time Period 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 
       Observations 9,520 9,520 9,520 9,520 9,520 8,788 
Adjusted R² 0.68 0.64 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.65 
European Facilities 537 537 537 537 537 488 
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Table 4 
I-Grade versus Junk for term loan issuers 
This table provides results of a linear regression of AISD on Europe (0/1) and control variables as reported in 
Panel B of Table 2. The coefficients on the control variables are not shown for brevity, a variable definition is 
provided in Appendix A. Fixed effects for year, two-digit SIC code, and borrower credit rating as well as other 
loan characteristics are included but not shown. We report results for the full sample in column (1), for the 
subsample of investment grade loans (I-Grade) in column (2) and for non-investment-grade loans (Junk) in 
columns (3). We report t-values based on standard errors clustered at the borrowing firm in parentheses. ***, **, 
* denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level, respectively.	
 
 All grades I-Grade Junk Sample: Term Loans Term Loans Term Loans 
 (1) (2) (3)  Variable AISD AISD AISD 
    Europe (0/1) -21.75* -48.43*** 0.29 
 (-1.84) (-4.33) -0.02     Other Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Credit Rating FE Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose & Type FE Yes Yes Yes 
    Time Period 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 
Observations 3,678 1,107 2,571 
Adjusted R² 0.34 0.53 0.28 
European Facilities 405 266 139 
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Table 5 
Ex-Post Performance 
This table provides results of linear regressions of post loan issue changes in borrower credit rating (Δ Rating (+1Y)) and profitability (Δ Prof. (+1Y)) on a European market 
dummy and control variables as reported in Table 2. Δ Rating is defined as the difference in rating notches between t+1 (one year after the loan issue) and t=0 (rating at loan 
origination). Positive (negative) values indicate downgrades (upgrades). Δ Prof. is defined as the difference in profitability at t+1 and t=0. Positive (negative) values indicate 
profitability increases (decreases). For variable definitions see Appendix A. Fixed effects for year, two-digit SIC code, and borrower credit rating as well as other loan 
characteristics are included but not shown. Columns (1) to (4) report results from regressions using investment-grade rated loans. Columns (5) to (8) report results from 
regressions using only non-investment grade rated loans. Results are reported separately for credit lines (columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6)) and term loans (columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8)). 
We report t-values based on standard errors clustered at the borrowing firm in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level, respectively. 
 
Sample: I-Grade Junk 
 Credit Lines Term Loans Credit Lines Term Loans 
 Δ Rating (+1Y) Δ Prof. (+1Y) Δ Rating (+1Y) Δ Prof. (+1Y) Δ Rating (+1Y) Δ Prof. (+1Y) Δ Rating (+1Y) Δ Prof. (+1Y) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  Variable AISD AISD AISD AISD AISD AISD AISD AISD 
         Europe (0/1) 0.06 0.004 -0.71*** 0.016*** 0.08 -0.003 0.01 0.00 
 (-1.04) (-1.39) (-3.71) (-3.11) (-0.54) (-0.47) (-0.05) (-0.02)          Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Credit Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose & Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         Time Period 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 
Observations 6,202 5,896 1,046 951 2,879 3,031 2,258 2,393 
Adjusted R² 0.15 0.036 0.29 0.128 0.15 0.022 0.17 0.076 
European Facilities 441 449 256 252 67 75 105 125 
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Table 6 
Term loans: Controlling for Post-Issue Performance 
This table provides results of a linear regression of AISD on Europe (0/1) and control variables as reported in 
Table 2 using a sample of investment grade borrowers and term loans. The coefficients are not shown for 
brevity, a variable definition is provided in Appendix A. Column (1) repeats the results reported in column (4) of 
Table 4. In columns (2)-(3), we add changes in ex-post performance based on rating and profitability to the 
model specification. We add squared terms of ex-post performance changes in columns (3) and (4). Fixed effects 
for year, two-digit SIC code, and borrower credit rating as well as other loan characteristics are included but not 
shown. We report t-values based on standard errors clustered at the borrowing firm in parentheses. ***, **, * 
denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level, respectively. 
 
  Term Loans – Investment Grade Only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) Variable AISD AISD AISD AISD 
Europe (0/1) -48.43*** -35.42*** -34.97*** -34.18*** 
 (-4.33) (-3.17) (-2.77) (-2.93) Δ Rating (+1 Year)  15.92*** 15.27*** 15.58*** 
  (6.53) (6.39) (3.05) Δ Prof. (+1 Year)   -125.61 84.56 
   (-0.82) (.4) Δ Rating (+1 Year)²    -0.1 
    (-0.14) Δ Prof. (+1 Year)²    2236.32** 
    (2.04)      Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Credit Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     Time Period 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 
Observations 1,107 1,046 926 926 
Adjusted R² 0.53 0.56 0.55 0.56 
European Facilities 266 256 249 249 
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Table 7 
Competition from Institutional Lenders 
This table provides results of a linear regression of AISD on Europe (0/1) and control variables as reported in 
Table 2 using a sample of term loans. The coefficients are not shown for brevity, a variable definition is provided 
in Appendix A. Column (1) repeats the results reported in column (5) of Panel A of Table 2. In columns (2) and 
(4), we add Institutional (0/1), which is an indicator that is 1 if the loans is an institutional term loan (Term Loan 
B, Term Loan C,…, Term Loan H in Dealscan). We add the years 2003 to 2007 in columns (3) and (4). Fixed 
effects for year, two-digit SIC code, and borrower credit rating as well as other loan characteristics are included 
but not shown. We report t-values based on standard errors clustered at the borrowing firm in parentheses. ***, 
**, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level, respectively. 
 
Sample All Grades 
  Term Loans Term Loans Term Loans Term Loans 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    
Variable AISD AISD AISD AISD 
          
Europe (0/1) -65.26*** -45.76*** -21.75* -12.22    
  (-5.18) (-4.02) (-1.84) (-1.10)    
Institutional (0/1)   76.43***   51.30*** 
    (13.95)   (10.23)    
          
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Credit Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Time Period 1992-2002 1992-2002 1992-2007 1992-2007 
Observations 1,656 1,656 3,678 3,678 
Adjusted R² 0.44 0.50 0.34 0.37    
Institutional Loans (Term B) 565 565 1,649 1,649 
European Facilities 135 135 405 405    
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Table 8 
Instrumented Equity Volatility: Rated versus Non-Rated Companies – Credit Lines 
This table provides results of OLS and IV regressions of AISD and TBC on European market dummies and control variables. In the IV specifications the standard deviation of 
the ratio of borrowers’ quarterly book equity to assets ratio, Book Equity Volatility, and the standard deviation of the ratio of borrowers’ quarterly cash and short-term investment 
to assets, Cash & STI Volatility, are used as instruments for the borrowers’ stock return volatility (see Gaul and Uysal (2013)). For variable definitions see Appendix A. Fixed 
effects for year, two-digit SIC code, and borrower credit rating as well as other loan and borrower characteristics are included but not shown. We report t-values based on 
standard errors clustered at the borrowing firm in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level, respectively. 
 
  Rated Firms Non-Rated Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Variable AISD TCB AISD TCB AISD TCB AISD TCB 
Europe (0/1) -22.45*** -0.06 -22.92*** 0.19 -41.45*** -2.68 -25.75*** 4.42 
 (-4.47) (-0.02) (-4.23) -0.06 (-7.57) (-0.89) (-3.94) -1.27 Predicted Vola   -0.42 0.36   3.25*** 1.68*** 
   (-0.32) -0.49   -5.56 -5.4          Specification OLS OLS IV (2nd stage) IV (2nd stage) OLS OLS IV (2nd stage) IV (2nd stage) 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower Contr. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Credit Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         Time Period 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 
Observations 5,169 5,082 5,169 5,082 4,712 4,437 4,712 4,437 
Adjusted R² 0.7 0.68 0.67 0.71 0.49 0.51 0.38 0.38 
Euro. Facilities 366 342 366 342 530 493 530 493 
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Table 9 
Instrumented Equity Volatility: Rated versus Non-Rated Companies – Term Loans 
This table provides results of OLS and IV regressions of AISD and TBC on European market dummies and 
control variables. In the IV specifications the standard deviation of the ratio of borrowers’ quarterly book equity 
to assets ratio, Book Equity Volatility, and the standard deviation of the ratio of borrowers’ quarterly cash and 
short-term investment to assets, Cash & STI Volatility, are used as instruments for the borrowers’ stock return 
volatility (see Gaul and Uysal (2013)). For variable definitions see Appendix A. Fixed effects for year, two-digit 
SIC code, and borrower credit rating as well as other loan and borrower characteristics are included but not 
shown. We report t-values based on standard errors clustered at the borrowing firm in parentheses. ***, **, * 
denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level, respectively. 
 
  Rated Firms Non-Rated Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) Variable AISD AISD AISD AISD 
Europe (0/1) -24.64* -23.19* -85.25*** -36.40 
 (-1.94) (-1.83) (-7.41) (-1.61) Predicted Vola  0.56  4.50** 
  -0.36  -2.57      Specification OLS IV (2nd stage) OLS IV (2nd stage) 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower Contr. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Credit Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     Time Period 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 
Observations 1,903 1,903 2,154 2,154 
Adjusted R² 0.39 0.42 0.38 0.1 
Euro. Facilities 270 270 489 489 
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Appendix A 
Explanation of Variables 
Variable Source Description 
   
General   
Revolver (0/1) Dealscan Loans with type “Revolver/Line < 1 Yr.”, “Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr.”, 
“364-Day Facility”, “Limited Line” or “Revolver /Term Loan” as 
indicated in the facility table in Dealscan. 
Term Loan (0/1) Dealscan Loans with type “Term Loan”, “Term Loan A”-“Term Loan H” or 
“Delay Draw Term Loan” as indicated in the facility table in 
Dealscan. 
Other Loan (0/1) Dealscan Loans that are not classified as either term loans or revolver. 
Term B (0/1) Dealscan Loans with type “Term Loan B” to “Tern Loan H”. 
Purpose: Takeover (0/1) Dealscan Loans with purpose “Takeover” as indicated in the facility table in 
Dealscan. 
Purpose: Ship, Plane, or SPV Finance (0/1) Dealscan Loans with purpose “Aircraft finance” or ”Ship finance” as indicated 
in the facility table in Dealscan. 
Purpose: Project Finance (0/1) Dealscan Loans with purpose “Proj. finance” as indicated in the facility table in 
Dealscan. 
Purpose: CP Backup (0/1) Dealscan Loans with purpose “CP backup” as indicated in the facility table in 
Dealscan. 
Purpose: General Corporate (0/1) Dealscan Loans with purpose “Corp. purposes” as indicated in the facility table 
in Dealscan. 
Purpose: Other (0/1) Dealscan Loans with purpose “Other” as indicated in the facility table in 
Dealscan. 
   
Price Terms   
AISD Dealscan All-In-Spread-Drawn, defined as the sum of the spread over LIBOR 
or EURIBOR plus the facility fee. 
AISU Dealscan All-In-Spread-Undrawn, defined as the sum of the facility fee and the 
commitment fee. 
Spread Dealscan Spread over LIBOR, paid on drawn amounts on credit lines 
Facility Fee Dealscan Fee paid on the entire committed amount, regardless of usage. 
Commitment Fee Dealscan Fee paid on the unused amount of loan commitments. 
Upfront Fee (UF) Dealscan Fee paid upon completion of a syndicated loan. 
Utilization fee (UTF) Dealscan Fee paid on the entire drawn amount once a certain usage threshold 
has been exceeded 
Cancellation fee (CAF) Dealscan Fee paid if the syndicated loan is cancelled before maturity 
Usage Weighted Spread (UWS) Dealscan Weighted average of AISD and AISU. 
Total Cost of Borrowing (TCB) Dealscan Total cost of borrowing taking into account the spread, the facility 
fee, the commitment fee, the letter of credit fee, the utilization fee, 
the cancellation fee and the upfront fee  
   
Non-Price Terms   
Facility Amount Dealscan Facility amount in USD mn as indicated in the field FacilityAmt in 
the facility table in Dealscan. 
Maturity 1-3yr (0/1) Dealscan A dummy variable, which equals one if the loan maturity is between 
1 and 3 years, and zero otherwise. 
Maturity 3-6yr (0/1) Dealscan A dummy variable, which equals one if the loan maturity is between 
3 and 6 years, and zero otherwise. 
Maturity > 6yr (0/1) Dealscan A dummy variable, which equals one if the loan maturity larger than 
6 years, and zero otherwise. 
Maturity Dealscan Loan maturity in months. 
Secured (0/1) Dealscan Indicates whether the loan is secured by collateral. 
   
Borrower characteristics   
Europe (0/1) Dealscan A dummy variable, which equals one if the borrower is a European 
firm and zero otherwise. 
Rating: AAA…B S&P A dummy variable, which equals one if the borrower has an S&P 
rating of AAA ... B at the time of the loan issue. 
Δ Rating S&P Change in credit rating notches. 
Δ Prof. Compustat Change in ratio of EBITDA to sales. 
Stock Return Volatility CRSP/Datast
ream 
Standard deviation of firms’ weekly stock returns for each calendar 
year, annualized by multiplying by !""# $%. 
Book Equity Volatility Compustat Standard deviation of the ratio of borrowers’ quarterly book equity to 
assets ratio (measured over the last 8 fiscal quarters). 
Cash & STI Volatility Compustat Standard deviation of the ratio of borrowers’ quarterly cash and 
short-term investment to assets (measured over the last 8 fiscal 
quarters). 
Total Assets Compustat Total assets in USD mn. 
Leverage Compustat Ratio of book value of total debt to the book value of assets. 
Profitability Compustat Ratio of EBITDA to sales. 
MTB Compustat Ratio of (book value of assets – book value of equity + market value 
of equity) to book value of assets. 
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Appendix B 
Fees in the U.S. and the European Loan Market 
      
B.I. Descriptive Statistics 
      
This table provides summary statistics for loan price terms separately for the U.S. and the European market. 
Panel A reports statistics for borrowers that have an investment grade rating at the time of the loan issue. 
Panel B reports statistics for borrowers that have a junk rating at the time of the loan issue. For variable 
definitions see Appendix A. 
      
 Revolver 
 U.S. Market  European Market 
Variable Mean Observations  Mean Observations 
      
Panel A: Investment Grade      
AISD 64.07 5,860  48.37 462 
AISU 14.12 5,860  17.68 462 
Commitment Fee 22.96 1,220  18.07 438 
Facility Fee 11.59 4,711  8.65 27 
Utilization Fee 11.13 2,143  5.14 249 
Cancellation Fee 131.66 15  #NA #NA 
Upfront Fee 37.62 5,344  50.59 419 
      
Panel B: Junk Grades      
AISD 195.21 3,123  156.34 75 
AISU 40.00 3,123  47.95 75 
Commitment Fee 41.00 2,759  46.63 70 
Facility Fee 27.94 420  51.78 7 
Utilization Fee 21.29 85  14.37 16 
Cancellation Fee 143.43 167  200.00 2 
Upfront Fee 48.41 3,021  53.83 73 
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B.II. Total Cost of Borrowing Definition 
      
 
TCB =  Upfront Fee / Loan Maturity in Years (B.1) 
 + (1-PDD) x (Facility Fee + Commitment Fee) (B.2) 
 + PDD x (Facility Fee + Spread) (B.3) 
 + PDD x Prob(Utilization>UtilizationThreshhold | Usage > 0) x Utilization Fee  (B.4) 
 + Prob(Cancellation) x Cancellation Fee (B.5) 
 
The first term annualizes the one-time upfront fee using the contractual maturity of the 
loan. Using the contractual maturity provides a conservative estimate of the annualized 
impact of the upfront fee on the total cost of borrowing, given that a large fraction of loans are 
refinanced prior to the contractual maturity. The second and third terms are a weighted 
average of the AISU (annual facility fee plus annual commitment fee) and the AISD (annual 
facility fee plus annual spread). The fourth term adds the annual utilization fee a borrower has 
to pay if usage exceeds a certain threshold, usually either 33% or 50% of the credit limit. The 
utilization fee has to be paid on the whole used amount of the credit line and not just on the 
utilization part above the threshold. Finally, the last term reflects the cost of cancellation 
weighted by the annual probability that a cancellation. Following BSS (2015), we predict 
PDD, Prob(Utilization>UtilizationThreshhold |Usage > 0), and Prob(Cancellation).30 
BSS (2015) report, that the only fee type with an inaccurate coverage of fees in the 
Dealscan database is the upfront fee. In the U.S. over 80% of loan contracts contain an 
upfront fee, while this fraction is significantly lower in the Dealscan database.31 However, 
BSS (2015) also report that the information on the upfront fee is accurate if it is reported in 
																																								 																				
30  See BSS, Online Appendix, http://www.tobias-berg.com/index.php/dont-ignore-the-fees/. 
31  See BSS, who compare SEC filings to DealScan and find this discrepancy. 
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Dealscan. We follow BSS (2015) and deal with this issue by predicting the upfront fee if it is 
missing in Dealscan.32 
  
																																								 																				
32  See BSS, Online Appendix, http://www.tobias-berg.com/index.php/dont-ignore-the-fees/. 
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B.III. AISD vs. TCB Decomposition 
      
This table provides results of a linear regression of price terms on European market dummy and control 
variables. For variable definitions see Appendix A. Fixed effects for year, one-digit SIC code, and borrower 
credit rating as well as other loan characteristics are included but not shown. We report t-values based on 
standard errors clustered at the borrowing firm in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 
% level, respectively. 
      
Sample Revolver Revolver Revolver Revolver Revolver 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Variable TCB/ 
AISD 
AISU/ 
AISD 
UF/ 
AISD 
UTF/ 
AISD 
CAF/ 
AISD 
      
Europe (1992-2002) (0/1) 0.23*** 0.12*** 0.44*** -0.02** 0.00 
 (6.39) (13.88) (7.66) (-2.28) (0.09) 
      
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Credit Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 8,788 9,520 8,857 9,520 9,520 
Adjusted R² 0.55 0.27 0.55 0.22 0.07 
 
Table B.III. reports the results of multivariate regressions of the TCB components on 
a European-dummy and covariates associated with the riskiness of loans and borrowers to 
analyze, which components explain the difference between TBC and AISD. Column 2 shows 
that the AISU is significantly higher for European loans also in a multivariate analysis (12% 
with a t-stat of 15). 
	
	
	
